Elo Ruby backend has Remote Code Execution via unescaped `#{...}` interpolation in emitted string literals and subtype-constraint labels
Not on CISA's list of exploited flaws, and not in the news we track.
Reading the vendor advisory
Fix it in your code
Each opens with a short prompt that points at Global Hack Map's public runbook for CVE-2026-44266. Nothing runs until you send it.
Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, the Ruby backend in src/compilers/ruby.ts embeds attacker-controlled text in Ruby double-quoted strings without escaping #, so Ruby interpolation forms in the string-literal emitter or the labelled subtype-constraint branch become executable Ruby. The affected entry points include the /try playground with the Ruby target, bin/eloc -t ruby -x, and defaultFormats.elo.parse() followed by Ruby emission. A failing labelled subtype constraint evaluates its message, while an ordinary string literal is evaluated when the compiled Ruby runs, allowing Ruby code and shell command execution through backticks. JavaScript, Python, and SQL emission are not affected by this Ruby-specific path. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.
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The fix