OpenHuman: Yuanbao non-web channel can bypass human approval to execute `node_exec`
Not on CISA's list of exploited flaws, and not in the news we track.
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OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.57.13, a remote direct message received through a configured Yuanbao channel is converted into a generic channel AgentTurnRequest that uses the default tool policy without establishing an interactive approval context. Under the default Supervised autonomy policy with Node enabled, node_exec is classified as a write operation that should prompt for approval, but ApprovalGate treats missing APPROVAL_CHAT_CONTEXT as a non-interactive turn and allows execution. Because Yuanbao direct messages are open by default, an external sender who can message the connected bot can influence the agent to execute JavaScript and operating-system commands as the OpenHuman user without an approval prompt. The issue requires a configured Yuanbao channel, the default approval-requiring policy state, Node availability, and successful model selection of node_exec. This issue is fixed in version 0.57.13.
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