: SAML callback trusts an unverified SAMLResponse, allowing authentication bypass and account takeover
Not on CISA's list of exploited flaws, and not in the news we track.
9.1of 10, critical
Reading the vendor advisory
Fix it in your code
Each opens with a short prompt that points at Global Hack Map's public runbook for CVE-2026-102894. Nothing runs until you send it.
GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. From 0.7.1 until 2.2.2, the /auth/saml/callback endpoint decoded SAML XML, used its NameID and attributes to resolve or provision a user, and minted a gpustack_session JWT without calling OneLogin_Saml2_Auth.process_response to verify the signature, issuer, audience, destination, or time conditions. Any network client could submit an identity for an existing user, including an administrator, or provision a new non-administrator account, even when SAML was not configured. Response and Assertion identifiers were not consumed, so captured signed responses could also be replayed. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.2.
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The fix