: Authentication bypass via trusted loopback source (reverse-proxy TCP peer or X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) grants unauthenticated adm
Not on CISA's list of exploited flaws, and not in the news we track.
9.8of 10, critical
Reading the vendor advisory
Fix it in your code
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GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.
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The fix